Patriots vs. Traitors, Faith vs. Godlessness, Good vs. Evil, Friends vs. Foes:
The Polarizing Rhetoric of the War on Terror
War is no stranger to the art of rhetoric – nor is politics. In fact, it is not uncommon for the three forces to work together concertedly in attempt to garner public support while accomplishing the agenda of the political “elite.” At best this type of rhetoric is used as a sort of national rallying cry, and, at worst, it is used to manipulate in the form of pure propaganda. Yet, regardless of which end of the rhetorical spectrum a nation falls, rhetoric is being used to portray (and in a sense “advertise”) all sorts of images – about a nation, about its agenda, about its allies and about its enemies.
While rhetoric is a force that is forever wrapped around politics and political decisions worldwide, occasionally there are moments in history when its use is made particularly – almost eerily – visible. One of these such moments was sparked by the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. September 11 marked a very vulnerable time for the United States as a nation, a time when many were afraid and concerned for the safety of the nation – a time when many were looking for leadership. So began not one, but two wars which promised to be just the beginning of a global “war on terror” – a war situated in rhetoric that made the course of action not only palpable but justifiable to a public looking for answers. However, the rhetorical moves used in introducing and perpetuating the war were nothing new, some actually harkening back to rhetorical strategies as old as the writings of Plato.
On the evening of September 11, President George W. Bush gave his first sustained speech to the nation, saying:
“Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror …Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature…. The search is underway for those who were behind these evil acts. I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. “
Perhaps it was at this point that the nation was officially re-introduced to a flavor of rhetoric that is often attributed to Leo Strauss, a German Jewish intellectual who was born in Germany in 1899 and died in the United States in 1973. However, what he was most famous for was his many rhetorical and philosophical writings offering a great deal of comprehensive critique on liberalism (Xenos, 3). According to Xenos’ article entitled “Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror” published in the spring 2004 edition of Logos Journal, although Strauss died in 1973, much of his rhetoric still lives on in Washington. In fact, according to Xenos, it is easily recognizable due to its “stilted, sometimes archaic” terms – terms that Xenos asserts found their way into the rhetoric of the “War on Terror” (12).
According to Xenos, the most obvious place Strauss’ influence is seen is in the Bush administration’s use of the term “regime.” One of the definitive moments of the War on Terror was when the public began to see exactly what “regime change” under the Bush administration meant. However, those who were familiar with Strauss’s writings would not have been surprised at all.
“ ‘Regime’ is the term that Strauss used to translate the Greek politeia, an Aristotleian category, and Strauss understood it to mean –what it more or less does mean in Aristotle – the form of a city; that is, its essence as opposed to the unformed humans, the matter, that the city forms. “ (12)
Thus, this rhetorical move is not only a Straussian one, but in actuality echoes back to the writings of Aristotle. Xenos goes on to say that in Book Three of Aristotle’s Politics, Aristotle makes the case that there are different kinds of polities – democracies, aristocracies, and so on – and that in each case, if one changes into another it is not only the government that changes, but also the citizens. Thus, it is a total transformation of the city’s essence, “a formal transformation,” according to Xenos. Thus, the talk about “regime change,” which may have been a fairly new term in United States foreign relations, essentially meant “a total transformation of the model of the society in question rather than a simple change of government in the narrow sense. This had immediate effects in the policy in Iraq.” (12)
An interesting question brought up by considerations of “regime change” was the inevitable question of what the best “city” or form of government is. This inevitable question permeated much of the discourse surrounding the War on Terror. “On the one hand, the Bush administration always says it is not making judgments; on the other hand it is clear that there is a preferred form for the transformation they seek to effect, which they call liberal democracy – a combination of market economics and the appearance of representative political institutions” (12—13). This kind of comparing and assigning of value paralleled the now very polarized world that followed September 11. There was talk of “good” governments, or the “best” type of government – a government characterized by “freedom.” Likewise, there was talk of “bad” or “evil” individuals – individuals who would try to “threaten” this freedom.
The almost all-consuming talk of “good” and “evil” that suddenly became a normal part of foreign policy after September 11 also echoes back to Straussian rhetoric – and is a rhetorical tactic that was also called upon by conservative giant Ronald Reagan himself in his notion of the “evil empire.” Under Reagan, this approach gave new life to the Republican party, igniting a base of individuals that sought for something greater than politics but instead to feel part of an epic battle in which the United States was fighting for justice in the face of “the forces of evil. (13)”
“William Kristol and Robert Kagan coauthored an article in Foreign Affairs in 1996 entitled ‘Towards a New-Reaganite Foreign Policy.’ They argued for the importance for conservatives to put moral judgments back at the center of American foreign policy as Reagan had with the notion of the ‘evil empire.’ They, along with Carnes Lord (a member of the Reagan administration and Quayle staff as well as Aristotle translator), saw ‘the crisis of liberalism’[…] as a crisis of the political class and leadership in this country. He blamed the agenda of what he called ‘multiculturalism’ in both domestic and foreign affairs for the fact, as he saw it, that we had lost our way in this country.” (13)
It seems that the “rhetoric of morality” was something that the public was hungry for. William Bennett (author of the book of virtues) wrote in an Op-Ed piece written in the Wall Street Journal in September 2002 entitled “Teaching September Eleventh” that,
“ An appropriate response to September eleventh begins with a kind of moral clarity, a clarity that calls evil by its true name, terms like evil, wrong, and bad were rightly put back into the lexicon. September eleventh also requires that we point to what is good and right and true. The dark day was pierced with rays of courage, honor, and sacrifice and they should be upheld for all to see, they too are enduring lessons.” (13—14)
Simply put, September 11 was a chance to make foreign policy about morals during a time of moral relativism. It was a chance to see a postmodern world in black and white terms.
Finally, a third element of Straussian rhetoric employed throughout the War on Terror was the division of the world into “friends” and “enemies.” According to Strauss, the was of the philosopher is the way of Socrates – the way of the pursuit of wisdom – while the way of the world is that of Thrasymachus. The argument for justice made by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic is that justice is essentially “helping friends and hurting enemies.” (15) This moral compass is the one through which Straussians see the world. Likewise, this is also the way the world was divided by the Bush administration in light of September 11. This is the kind of viewpoint that “does what it can for its friends, regardless of what regime they may have, and does what it can do to its enemies, or what the administration perceives as its enemies, domestic and foreign.” (14) Interestingly, this concept cannot be illustrated more clearly than in the United States’ relationship with Israel. Douglas Kellner points this out in his article, “Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the ‘War on Terror,’” as he notes:
“On the afternoon of September 11, Ariel Sharon, leader of Israel, himself implicated in war crimes in Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon in 1982, came on global television to convey his regret, condolences, and assurance of Israel’s support in the war on terrorism. Sharon called for a coalition against terrorist networks, which would mobilize the civilized world against terrorism, posing the Good versus Evil, ‘humanity’ versus ‘the blood-thirsty,’ ‘the free world’ against ‘the forces of darkness,’ which re ‘trying to destroy ‘freedom’ and our ‘way of life.’ […] The Bush-Cheney administration would take up precisely the same troupes, with President Bush constantly evoking the ‘evil’ of the terrorists, using the word five times in his first statement on the September 11 terror assaults. Bush also declared that the attacks were an ‘act of war’ against the United States, presaging the era of war that was to come” (Kellner, 6-7).
It is at this point that we begin to see that something seems terribly wrong. If the aforementioned values of “good” and “evil” were consistent, wouldn’t an individual who has been implicated in war crimes – some of the very same things the Bush administration faulted Saddam Hussein with – be in the “enemies” category rather than in the “friends” category? Wouldn’t this individual be considered a perpetuator of terror, as someone who is “evil” rather than “good?”
Here, this gap of sorts opens into a larger discussion of rhetoric and political ideology – and again a discussion that seems to be once more born out of the ideology of Strauss and his disciples. Strauss spent much of his writing considering the concept of tyranny – and upon reading his writings, one comes to an interesting realization: Strauss seemed to believe that there were essentially two kinds of tyrannies – a tyranny that is basically bad, yet also a tyranny that is basically good. In fact, Strauss was an admirer of both Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill – two individuals that, although perceived to be “good,” can also be seen as tyrants of sorts. Lincoln, for instance, sidestepped the Constitution during the Civil War – something that the Bush administration ultimately did during the War in Iraq and in the Patriot Act which, according to the ACLU, violates First Amendment Free Speech and Fifth Amendment Due Process rights in sections 505(a) and 805(a)(2)(B). Likewise, Straussians are said to love Lincoln mainly because he was “not reluctant to set the law aside when he felt it was necessary” and also due to his effort to construct “a mythology about American identity, a patriotic mythology.” (Xenos, 15) Lincoln is a very important figure in Straussian ideology because he “resorted to tyrannical measures when he had to and because he sought to mythically restore heroic virtues” (15—16) – interestingly, two of the Bush administration’s defining characteristics. Winston Churchill is also a darling of the Straussians due to the fact that although he was somewhat of a tyrant, he stood up to Hitler. Thus, Churchill’s actions are often seen as being representative of the power of the “good tyrant” standing up to the “bad tyrant” (16) – another sentiment that became all too familiar as the course of events played out both in the United States and in Iraq.
This double-sided definition of the seemingly black and white concept of tyranny is just one more example of the complications and shades of grey that, behind the scenes, characterize the seemingly black and white world painted by the Bush administration and those who adhere to this brand of rhetoric and political ideals. In keeping with these shades of grey is a concept known as the “noble lie” – a concept introduced by Plato in The Republic. According to Plato, a “noble lie” is essentially a lie told by an elite to maintain social harmony, particularly when it comes to the power of the elite in question. Although the noble lie may be designed to benefit all parties involved, it is unlike a white lie in that if discovered, it would cause controversy – whereas a white lie would not. Perhaps the concept of the noble lie was taken a bit far by the Bush Administration. A few of the “noble lies” that were eventually found out by the American public included the absence of any weapons of mass destruction as well as the idea that the world generally has a positive perception of the United States, that the Iraqis saw the United States forces as liberators, and that casualties from the war were relatively few (in fact, photos of flag-draped caskets were outlawed until President Barack Obama was elected – a law that was originally put into place by President George Bush senior).
However, the administration of George W. Bush is not the only player at fault for many of the blunders that occurred during the war in Iraq. In fact, it seems that they were following what was a trend of indiscretions both perpetuated by the media and policymakers that had come before – a trend that was allowed to continue due to some of the public’s seemingly undying faith in both God and the man that they saw as his representative. All the checks and balances that had formerly been in place were now seemingly forgotten. The media, a force that was supposed to be a “watchdog,” keeping track of those in power, never made a fuss whatsoever when it came to the censoring that was being perpetuated in attempt, it seems, to garner a positive image of the war in Iraq. In fact, it was the media that often spurred on the administrations rhetoric, of all sorts. Many popular networks sported logos advertising the “War on America,” the “Attack on America,” and “America Under Attack,” which, according to Kellner, “circulated discourses that assumed that the United States was at war and that only a military response was appropriate” (Kellner, 13). Political higher-ups bought the excuses given by Pentagon advisers who said that showing images of flag-draped coffins, for instance, “might compel families to travel to Dover to be there to receive their loved ones’ remains rather than wait for them to arrive home.” The ban was also said to be in effect as an attempt to protect the privacy of grieving families – excuses that Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, said he was “never comfortable with.” The true intent of this sort of visual rhetoric was detected by some, however. “Democrats tried to lift the ban [in 2004] but were rebuffed by the Republican-controlled Congress. Sen. Frank Lautenberg, D-N.J., said at the time that the ban was an attempt to ‘conceal from the American people the true costs of this war’” (Stone, 1). And the public seemed more than willing to be spoon-fed whatever message the administration conjured up due the fact that they wanted to have faith in some kind of hero – while the religious rhetoric surrounding the person of George W. Bush served as a polarizing force for those in the religious community.
Bush often played up his role as the “hero” – both religious and otherwise – in his use of rhetoric during his speeches about the war. He used cowboy metaphors, such as demanding Bin Laden “dead or alive” (Kellner, 4) – a rhetorical move that harkened back to the quintessential American hero, a symbol of freedom and what it means to be American. He used religious metaphors, describing the campaign as a “crusade” (Kellner, 4). In fact, some of this rhetoric proved to be so strong that it made devoted disciples of many Americans – even in the face of what many would consider to be sure signs of doom. In his article, “The Rhetoric of Bush’s War on Evil,” Robert Ivie tells readers of a woman named Jodi Crawford who was being interviewed by Jim Axelrod in the “swingtown” of Allentown, Pennsylvania — a town which he deemed a “microcosm of America in most every way – including how it votes in Presidential elections” (Ivie, 1). Crawford was a woman whose husband was in the National Guard and still had a year remaining on his tour duty in Iraq.
“A solider in his platoon had just been killed in combat. Crawford was understandably worried and wished that the war could suddenly end so that her husband could return home safely. Yet her faith in the President was unshaken. She would vote for George W. Bush ‘because he’s a Christian’” (Ivie, 1).
While this would have been no unusual statement, should it have occurred earlier, at this point in the war, things had already turned from bad to worse. A war and President that initially had the majority of the public’s support was now being likened to the popularity of Vietnam. The dirty details had begun to emerge, including the scandal at Abu Ghraib – along with shocking pictures and details. Worldwide support and perception of the U.S. had begun to plummet,
“yet Jodi Crawford stood by her President and his aggressive policy of preemptive warfare because he was a Christian. Her simple declaration of faith opened a window on the nation’s soul for anyone to witness while watching and listening that evening. America’s war on Iraq was animated by religious conviction; it was a test of Christian faith and of faith in a fellow Christian; it was no more and no less than a war waged against evil, a fight to preserve the nation’s soul personified in its President. Americans were making themselves right with God at home and abroad by slaying the Devil’s henchmen. Down home in this microcosm of the nation, Christian America was crusading for a righteous cause and was determined to win an apocalyptic war of civilizations” (Ivie, 1).
Stories such as this showed just the kind of power that such religious rhetoric carried. Not only did it gather the support of many from faith-based communities, but it made George Bush a symbol of faith, a crusader in the name of Christianity. To turn one’s back on him, on the administration’s agenda and on the war would be to turn one’s back on God himself. However, in a somewhat ironic twist of events, this religious rhetoric also gave the administration the ability to cast blame on an “international devil figure.”
“For Hitler’s Germany, [this devil figure] was the international Jew; for Bush’s America, it is the international Islamic terrorist […] Once the international devil was essentialized, all ‘proof’ of his deadly omnipresence was henceforth automatic and all of secular […] capitalism’s complex shortcomings could be simplified and too easily accounted for by projecting them onto a palpable and convenient scapegoat” (Ivie, 1).
However, not being a person of faith didn’t constitute a problem, either. According to Kellner, “Bush merged the ‘great nation.’ ‘resolve,’ ‘faith,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘love’” in his speech as to appeal to common values and to unite the nation. “His use of ‘we,’ I,’ and you’ serve[d] as rhetorical devices to bind himself with the country” (Kellner, 4).
This dangerous combination of rhetoric garnered just the right amount of seemingly “blind” support from the public to eventually enable not only the kind of “sidestepping of the Constitution” practiced by Lincoln during the Civil War, but also the institution of the Patriot Act – a piece of legislation that made such violations legal. Manipulated by the force of rhetoric, the American people – the representatives of the ideal of freedom in the modern world – now found themselves caught in a tyranny of sorts. At best it would be how the administration most likely imagined it – a “good tyranny,” a tyranny that, in the end, would serve the best interests of all involved. And, at best, any half-truths or mis-truths would be seen as “noble lies” – messages perpetuated for the good of all parties involved. However, as the American people and the world began to see (not necessarily in that order), these scenarios did not come to pass. The tyranny did not turn out to be “good” – or beneficial. The “noble lies” were discovered to be disgraceful lies marked with the lust for money and power that dripped from the political and economic elite. And, in the end, it seems that despite all of the convincing rhetoric in the world, the administration as well as its initiatives will go down in history as a dismal failure – a failed operation run by a man who was ill-equipped and motives that were ill-conceived, at best. Yet, that doesn’t change the fact that it happened. Almost the entire agenda of the administration happened – and, thanks (no doubt) to the administration’s precise use of rhetoric, much of it happened with the blessing of the American people. Perhaps Paul Rutherford explains it best in his book, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq, in which he tells readers about an interview he conducted with a Canadian artist by the name of Glenna, who, he says, described the Iraq War as the “War by Disney.” “You could almost say this was a war invented and produced by Disney studios,” she said. “It was monumental, it was full of slogans and images, it was like a production. And it happened, and [they] got over it so fast …they got away with it, too” (Rutherford, 3).
Maybe it was the “war by Disney.” Perhaps the entire thing was designed as some sort of bad fairytale that would defy everyone’s wildest imaginations in actually coming true. However, who better to design a war than Disney? After all, we all would like to live in a Disney world – a world in which if one says just the right words, they will come true, a world in which the “good guys” defeat the “bad guys” and everyone lives “happily ever after.”
Works Cited:
The ACLU. “Myths and Realities About the Patriot Act.” ACLU. 3 Dec. 2009 <http://action.aclu.org/reformthepatriotact/facts.html#ten>.
Ivie, Robert. “The Rhetoric of Bush’s War on Evil.” Kbjournal. 3 Dec. 2009 < http://kbjournal.org/nextphase>.
Kellner, Douglas. “Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying. Presidential Rhetoric in the ‘War on Terror.’” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 37.4 (Dec. 2007): 1—25.
Rutherford, Paul. Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.
Stone, Andrea. “Ban on Photos of U.S. Troops’ Coffins Lifted.” Feb. 2009: 1–. USA Today. 3 Dec. 2009 < http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-26-pentagon-coffins_N.htm>.
Xenos, Nicholas. “Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of the War on Terror.” Logos Journal 3.2 (Spring 2004): 1-19.
